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RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS AND 
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: THE 
CASE FOR IN-REGION LOCATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
William Griffin* 
Abstract: Electricity generation facilities are the single largest source of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. Although renewable gen-
eration facilities offer a cleaner alternative to traditional, carbon-intensive 
methods of electricity generation, output from renewable facilities is less 
reliable and more costly relative to facilities that burn fossil fuels. There-
fore, in an unfettered marketplace, investment in renewable energy facili-
ties would be slow if not stagnant. In response to concerns regarding an-
thropogenic climate change and fuel diversity, an increasing number of 
state governments have implemented statutory and regulatory regimes to 
incentivize the construction of renewable generation facilities within state 
or regional borders. These programs run the risk of violating the 
dormant Commerce Clause because they provide for differential treat-
ment of electricity based, at least in part, upon the commodity’s geo-
graphic origin. This Note argues that state programs that condition bene-
fits upon the in-region location of a renewable generation facility or 
physical delivery of electricity from a facility in a neighboring region can 
survive scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Introduction 
 A reliable source of electricity is necessary to support innumerable 
aspects of our everyday lives.1 Unfortunately, the myriad benefits of 
readily accessible electricity come with environmental costs.2 In 2010, 
                                                                                                                      
* Executive Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2013–2014. 
1 See Use of Electricity, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/ 
index.cfm?page=electricity_use (last updated Apr. 26, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/ 
08w6C6JUTos. 
2 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What Are the Op-
tions?, 36 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 17 (2009). Electricity generation relies heavily on coal 
as a fuel source. Id. Furthermore, “[c]oal combustion not only is responsible for CO2 emis-
sions, but also produces conventional air pollutants that have adverse health and ecosys-
tem effects.” Id. 
134 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:133 
electric generation facilities produced seventy-two percent of reported 
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.3 The EPA estimates that 
forty percent of the United States’s carbon emissions are the product of 
coal-fired power generation alone.4 
 Growing awareness of the adverse effects of greenhouse gases has 
prompted federal, state, and local governments to push for an increase 
in the utilization  of renewable or “green” energy sources.5 Due to the 
significant cost advantages of generating electricity by burning fossil 
fuels, growth in renewable energy generation capacity would be slow, if 
not stagnant, in an unfettered marketplace.6 In the early 1980s, Iowa 
became the first state to use a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) to 
combat the market forces favoring fossil fuel-based generation.7 The 
basic premise behind an RPS is to create a separate market where re-
newable electricity does not directly compete with less costly electricity 
produced by burning fossil fuels.8 
 Some commentators have addressed concerns that many states 
might be violating the dormant Commerce Clause when implementing 
RPSs.9 Such concerns stem from RPS provisions that provide special 
incentives for generation within the enacting state or the enacting 
state’s geographic region.10 Although federal courts have not yet issued 
rulings on the constitutionality of RPSs, many commentators believe 
that it is only a matter of time before an RPS is struck down as unconsti-
tutional.11 Recent litigation in the Ninth Circuit concerning the consti-
                                                                                                                      
3 Dina Cappiello, EPA: Power Plants Are Main Global Warming Culprits, USA Today (Jan. 
11, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/environment/story/2012–
01–11/greenhouse-gases-power-plants/52502466/1, available at http://perma.cc/0zQ1AG 
wFmBQ; see also Steven Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control 
Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 125, 130 (2010) 
(“GHG emissions in the 21st century are mainly a result of power generation.”). 
4 Ferrey et al., supra note 3. 
5 Donald S. McCauley et al., Capturing the Power of Electric Restructuring 
175 ( Joey Lee Miranda ed., 2009); Melissa Powers, Small Is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. 
Energy Policies to Increase Localized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 Wisc. Int’l L.J. 595, 605 
(2012). 
6 See Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 Envtl. & 
Energy L. & Pol’y J. 34, 42–43 (2009). 
7 Iowa Code Ann. § 476.41 (West 2009); see Joshua P. Fershee, The Law of Clean 
Energy 80 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011). 
8 McCauley et al., supra note 5. 
9 See infra notes 180–189 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 55–60 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 177–179 and accompanying text. 
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tutionality of other environmental statutes might lend credence to the 
commentators’ speculation.12 
 This Note discusses the legal viability of RPSs that explicitly favor 
renewable generation facilities located within a particular geographic 
region. Part I discusses the mechanics of an RPS and the various geo-
graphic preferences that states have built into RPS statutes and regula-
tions.13 This discussion is not limited to RPSs that favor in-region re-
newable energy, but rather covers a variety of RPSs currently in effect. 
Because alternative courses of action are considered in a dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis, a basic understanding of various RPS struc-
tures is necessary. Part II summarizes the Supreme Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, including the different levels of judi-
cial scrutiny and potential exceptions to the application of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.14 Part III examines recent challenges to RPSs and 
other litigation related to the dormant Commerce Clause and state-
level environmental statutes.15 This Note concludes that RPSs explicitly 
favoring in-region renewable generation facilities are not inconsistent 
with the dormant Commerce Clause.16 
I. The Context of Renewable Energy Mandates 
A. RPS Fundamentals 
1. RPS Policy and Planning 
 An RPS is a statutory or regulatory mandate that retail sellers of 
electricity include a certain amount of renewable energy in their 
wholesale electricity mix.17 Common examples of energy sources that 
qualify for state RPSs include wind energy, solar photovoltaic energy, 
geothermal energy, and tidal energy.18 An RPS creates a separate mar-
ket for renewable electricity within a state or region and thereby incen-
tivizes developers to invest in and build renewable energy capacity.19 
                                                                                                                      
12 See infra notes 156–173 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 17–83 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 84–146 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 147–182 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 228–274 and accompanying text. 
17 Fershee, supra note 7, at 77; McCauley et al., supra note 5; Nancy Rader & 
Scott Hempling, Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs, The Renewables Port-
folio Standard 1–2 (2001). 
18 Fershee, supra note 7, at 79. 
19 See McCauley et al., supra note 5. RPSs supplement federal tax credits to promote 
investment in large-scale renewable energy facilities. See Powers, supra note 5, at 613. 
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Different RPSs function in a variety of ways.20 For example, an RPS can 
require a retail seller of electricity to procure a specified percentage of 
its wholesale power from qualifying renewable energy sources.21 Alter-
natively, an RPS can mandate that a retail seller procure, in absolute 
terms, a certain amount of electricity from renewable generation facili-
ties.22 Furthermore, an RPS can focus on the amount of installed re-
newable energy capacity.23 
 RPSs have traditionally been promulgated at the state level.24 Ini-
tially, public utility commissions (PUCs) created and implemented 
RPSs, but state legislatures have increasingly begun to implement statu-
tory mandates themselves.25 As of November 2013, thirty-one states and 
the District of Columbia have an RPS or an “alternative portfolio stand-
ard,” while an additional seven states specify voluntary goals for renew-
able electricity procurement.26 The fundamental policy goal behind an 
RPS is to increase the proportion of the wholesale electricity mix that is 
derived from renewable energy sources.27 
 Due to limitations surrounding the construction of generation and 
transmission facilities, states and PUCs phase in RPSs gradually.28 RPS-
                                                                                                                      
20 Ryan Wiser et al., Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., Renewa-
bles Portfolio Standards: A Factual Introduction to Experience from the United 
States 4 (2007). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. Capacity refers to the sum of megawatt hours that energy facilities are capable of 
generating under specific conditions. What Is the Difference Between Electricity Generation Capacity 
and Electricity Generation?, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq. 
cfm?id=101&t=3 (last updated Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/0Gmyzmv2p4z. 
24 Wiser et al., supra note 20, at 1. 
25 Ken Silverstein, Would Efforts Backfire to Repeal Renewable Portfolio Standards?, EnergyBiz 
(Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.energybiz.com/article/12/11/would-efforts-backfire-repeal-
renewable-portfolio-standards, available at http://perma.cc/0Qvb5LScPVS. One commenta-
tor describes this process as the “democratization of renewables policy.” Id. 
26 Renewable and Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, Ctr. for Climate and Energy So-
lutions, http://www.c2es.org/node/9340 (last visited Nov. 20, 2013), available at http:// 
perma.cc/0dstvY8PE8L; Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. Energy Info. Ad-
min. (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850, available at 
http://perma.cc/0sxHfnUDDGj. 
27 Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra note 26. Other policy goals of 
RPSs include reducing carbon emissions, stimulating local economic activity, promoting 
diversity in generation, and increasing energy security. David Hurlbut, Nat’l Renewable 
Energy Lab., State Clean Energy Practices: Renewable Portfolio Standards 2 
(2008). 
28 See Michael Dworkin et al., The Law of Clean Energy 531–32 (Michael B. Ger-
rard ed., 2011) (discussing hardships of delivering renewable energy to locations where 
demand exists); Fershee, supra note 7, at 77; James W. Moeller, Interstate Electric Transmis-
sion Lines and States’ Rights in the Mid-Atlantic Region, 40 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 77, 78 
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implementing states typically structure their programs around a long-
term goal that is incrementally increased according to a predetermined 
compliance schedule.29 For example, Massachusetts’s RPS requires re-
tail sellers of electricity to source 15% of their electricity from Class I 
renewable energy sources by the year 2020, with an annual 1% increase 
thereafter.30 In the interim, the RPS sets out annual benchmarks to be 
met along the way.31 
2. RPS Design and Renewable Energy Certificates 
 A state legislature or PUC responsible for establishing an RPS has 
complete autonomy over its design.32 RPSs commonly feature a provi-
sion that specifies how much electricity a retail seller must purchase 
from renewable sources of energy, and some states take a more aggres-
sive approach than others.33 California, for example, has established a 
goal of 33% of retail sales by 2020,34 whereas Arizona’s RPS requires 
just 15% of retail sales after 2024.35 
 Furthermore, the legislature or PUC must decide what energy 
sources qualify as “renewable” under the RPS.36 The types of genera-
tion facilities that qualify under different RPSs vary widely by state.37 
                                                                                                                      
(2013) (noting that societal benefits of competition in wholesale power markets are lim-
ited by the availability of high-voltage transmission lines). Transmission is a particularly 
important issue in the renewable energy context because renewable fuel sources are not as 
easy to transport as fossil fuels. Dworkin et al., supra at 531. Unlike fossil fuels, which can 
be easily stored and transported by common carriers, the most economical way to produce 
electricity with renewable sources is to generate electricity at or near the source, and then 
use existing transmission lines to bring the electricity wherever it is demanded. Id. at 532. 
29 See Fershee, supra note 7, at 77. 
30 225 Mass. Code Regs. 14.07(1), (3) (2012). 
31 Id. at 14.07(1). From the present date through the year 2020, the annual increase 
required in Massachusetts is one percent per year. Id. In the early stages of RPS implemen-
tation, the RPS sometimes required only an one-half percent annual increase. Id. 
32 See Fershee, supra note 7, at 78. 
33 See id. at 77–80 (comparing Pennsylvania’s requirement of 8% by 2020 to New York’s 
requirement of 30% by 2015). 
34 Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.15(b)(2)(B) (West 2013). 
35 Ariz. Admin. Code § R14–2–1804(B) (2011). It is important to note that the per-
centage specified in the statute does not always demonstrate how a particular state’s RPS 
target will affect renewable energy development. See McCauley et al., supra note 5, at 
188. For example, although Maine’s thirty-percent requirement appears to be aggressive, 
the definition of renewable in Maine’s RPS includes hydroelectric facilities that pre-dated 
the RPS. See id. Because the state’s pre-existing renewable capacity was sufficient to meet 
the mandate, Maine’s RPS does not provide strong incentives for additional renewable 
construction. See id. 
36 See Fershee, supra note 7, at 79–80. 
37 Id. 
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Most RPSs consider sources such as wind, solar, geothermal, and tidal 
energy as renewable, but there is no consensus on the eligibility of 
sources such as biomass and municipal solid waste incineration.38 
 A state’s autonomy over its RPS extends to establishing which enti-
ties must comply with its provisions.39 A state can choose to have its RPS 
apply to all retail electricity sellers in the state or, like Minnesota, create 
specific provisions that in effect apply to one utility only.40 States often 
exempt entities such as municipalities and rural electric cooperatives 
from RPS requirements.41 
 States must also devise a method for regulated entities to demon-
strate compliance with an RPS.42 Unless a utility also owns a renewable 
generation facility, the utility generally complies with an RPS’s man-
dates through the purchase of renewable energy credits (REC), which 
have become the “currency” of renewable electricity markets.43 Gener-
ally, one REC represents the environmental attributes associated with 
the generation of one megawatt-hour of electricity.44 In an RPS that 
uses RECs, renewable power plants theoretically have two outputs that 
can be sold together or separately.45 The first output is the electricity 
                                                                                                                      
38 Wiser et al., supra note 20, at 5. Pennsylvania’s alternative energy standard illustrates 
how broadly some states define the term “renewable.” See 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1648.2 
(West 2008). In Pennsylvania, the combustion of waste coal is considered renewable in some 
circumstances. See id. The enacting body may tailor the RPS to the characteristics of the en-
acting state. Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra note 26. For example, a state 
with an abundant supply of commercial-grade wind energy will be inclined to incentivize the 
construction of wind farms to attract investment in renewable energy. See id. 
39 See Fershee, supra note 7, at 78. 
40 Alexandra B. Klass, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism 
Mismatch, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1801, 1832 n.157 (2012); compare 225 Mass. Code Regs. 14.04 
(applying to all Massachusetts electricity retailers), with Minn. Stat. § 216B.1691 subdiv. 
2a(b) (2010)(containing provisions that in effect only apply to only one utility). 
41 See Fershee, supra note 7, at 78. 
42 Wiser et al., supra note 20, at 3. 
43 Fershee, supra note 7, at 79; Envtl. Prot. Agency, Renewable Energy Certifi-
cates 1 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/documents/gpp_basics-recs. 
pdf and http://perma.cc/0Sw8jY5mb81. Because most states require regulated parties to 
demonstrate compliance with an RPS through the use of RECs, this Note assumes that an 
RPS uses REC trading unless explicitly stated otherwise. See Powers, supra note 5, at 611. 
44 Michael Zimmer et al., RECs Get Real, 145 No. 11 Pub. Util. Fort. 25, 25 (2007). 
45 Fershee, supra note 7, at 79. Absent a direct connection between generator and 
end-user, it is impossible to trace electrons in interstate commerce. See New York v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (2002) (“[E]lectricity flowing onto a power 
network or grid energizes the entire grid, and consumers then draw undifferentiated energy 
from that grid.”). Therefore, electricity does not necessarily follow its contract path from 
seller to purchaser. See Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money! Article I and Article VI Constitutional 
Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 Va. J.L. & Tech. 89, 105 (2012). 
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that the facility generates.46 The second output is a bundling of the 
electricity’s environmental attributes into a tradable financial instru-
ment.47 These financial instruments are RECs.48 
 RECs are common features of RPS programs for two reasons.49 
First, RECs increase flexibility in compliance with the mandates prom-
ulgated by an RPS.50 RECs increase flexibility because utilities do not 
have to construct their own renewable generation facilities to meet 
their renewable energy obligations.51 In addition to being self-
generated, RECs may be purchased in an REC trading market.52 Sec-
ond, RECs help reduce the financial burdens of implementing an 
RPS.53 A purchaser of RECs acquires the rights to the environmental 
attributes of renewable electricity but does not necessarily take physical 
delivery of the electricity itself.54 This arrangement allows for the 
avoidance of costs associated with the transmission and distribution of 
electricity across long distances, but does not assure a geographic nexus 
between the retail customer and some of the location-specific benefits 
of renewable energy.55 
                                                                                                                      
46 Fershee, supra note 7, at 79. 
47 McCauley et al., supra note 5, at 188. The environmental attributes usually repre-
sent the carbon-dioxide, sulfur-oxide, and nitrogen-oxide emissions profile of the electrici-
ty. Id. If the emissions profile meets the criteria set forth by the state RPS, a REC is pro-
duced along with the renewable electricity. Id. 
48 See id. 




53 Id. Per unit of output, renewable energy is more expensive than energy produced by 
burning fossil fuels. Stiles, supra note 6, at 43–44. 
54 Fershee, supra note 7, at 79; see Envtl. Prot. Agency, Renewable Energy Certif-
icates: Background & Resources 2 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/statelocal 
climate/documents/pdf/background_paper_recs_10-21-2008.pdf and http://perma.cc/ 
08fUPBkNwjc. 
55 See Int’l Electrotechnical Comm’n, Efficient Electrical Energy Transmis-
sion and Distribution 2 (2007). Electricity is lost in transmission due to resistance in 
transmission lines and conversion of the power from high to low voltages. Id. at 2, 7–8. The 
resistance in a transmission line represents friction and results in energy being lost as heat. 
Lana Wong, A Review of Transmission Losses in Planning Studies 8 (2011). The 
resistance within a transmission line increases as the line’s length increases, and therefore, 
losses are greater in longer transmission lines. Id. A California researcher stated “[i]n wet-
ter years, California hydropower generation may account for a larger source of generation 
while out-of-state generation and other in-state fossil units may account for less, so losses 
would be generally lower in wetter years.” Id. at 13–14. A seven-year study found a negative 
correlation between in-state hydroelectric generation and transmission losses. Id. 
140 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:133 
B. Examples of Geographic Preferences in State RPSs and Renewable Energy 
Certificate Tracking Systems 
 A driving interest behind state-level RPSs is exacting local benefits 
from the construction of renewable generation facilities.56 States want 
to retain the economic benefits of jobs and tax revenues, the environ-
mental benefits of displacing fossil fuel-intensive electricity generation, 
and the price-stability benefits of diversifying the energy portfolio of 
retail electricity suppliers.57 Consequently, states sometimes use their 
autonomy over RPS design to categorically exclude out-of-state or out-
of-region generation as ineligible, or to otherwise provide benefits to 
local renewable energy development.58 
 One commentator identified five main categories in which to or-
ganize existing geographic preferences in state RPS programs.59 The 
first category of geographic preferences involves a state awarding extra 
RECs based on the location of a renewable generation facility.60 The 
second category provides an explicit preference for in-state renewable 
generation.61 The third category involves limiting eligibility based on 
in-region, rather than in-state location of the renewable energy re-
source.62 The fourth category of geographic preferences involves defin-
ing an eligible resource as a generation facility that is located in a cer-
tain state or region.63 The fifth category involves providing extra 
                                                                                                                      
56 Hurlbut, supra note 27. 
57 Id. If added to the wholesale electricity mix, renewable power sources would likely 
be the first power sources dispatched by the system operator to meet market demand. 
Steven Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges to Accommodate New Renewable Ener-
gy Infrastructure, 39 Envtl. L. 977, 987–88 (2009). Despite the capital intensity of con-
structing a renewable generation facility, renewable fuel sources such as wind and solar 
energy are free. Id. Therefore, there is virtually no marginal cost associated with an addi-
tional unit of output from a renewable generator. Id. In New England, the systems opera-
tor dispatches generation units beginning with the lowest cost producer, meaning many 
renewable energy resources are the first to be dispatched. ISO New England Inc., The 
Benefits of Uniform Clearing Price Auctions for Pricing Electricity: Why Pay-as-
Bid Auctions Do Not Cost Less 1 (2006), available at http://www.iso-ne.com/pubs/ 
whtpprs/uniform_clearing_price_auctions.pdf and http://perma.cc/0PdR5ZMHnfk. 
58 See Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause 
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incentives and REC credits for renewable facilities that are built with in-
state labor and component parts.64 
1. Massachusetts and the New England Power Pool: In-State Location 
and In-Region Deliverability Requirements 
 RECs produced by facilities outside of New England must meet the 
requirements of the New England Power Pool Generation Information 
System (“NEPOOL-GIS”) Operating Rules and the Massachusetts regu-
lations to be eligible under Massachusetts’s RPS.65 NEPOOL-GIS is an 
REC tracking and accounting system that collects the generation char-
acteristics for every megawatt-hour of electricity produced within the 
ISO-New England (ISO-NE) system.66 NEPOOL-GIS only creates trada-
ble RECs for generation outside of New England if the generator ob-
tains transmission and actually delivers its energy into the ISO-NE con-
trol area.67 Therefore, except where these requirements are met, the 
Massachusetts regulations and ISO-NE Operating Rules effectively 
place Massachusetts into the category of states that restrict RPS eligibil-
ity based on the in-region location of generation facilities.68 
 Massachusetts’s RPS also mandates that a portion of the RPS obli-
gations are satisfied by solar energy technologies.69 The statute estab-
lishing Massachusetts’s RPS mandates the Department of Public Utili-
                                                                                                                      
64 Ferrey, supra note 58, at 72. 
65 225 Mass. Code Regs. 14.05(5). A “power pool” is a group of utilities “that has 
agreed informally to establish common principles and practices for interconnected opera-
tion, to jointly review area power supply problems and establish criteria for power supply 
adequacy, to exchange generation and transmission construction plans, and to seek coor-
dinated action for best economy and reliability . . . .” Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Regu-
lation of Public Utilities 640 (1993). Such a group “relies on voluntary adherence by 
members to pool principles and criteria.” Id. 
66 McCauley et al., supra note 5, at 195. ISO-NE is a corporation responsible for 
compensating wholesale electricity suppliers and continually using automated signals to 
increase or decrease output to instantaneously match changes in electricity demand. See 
ISO New England Inc., Overview of New England’s Wholesale Electricity Mar-
kets and Market Oversight 1 (2012) [hereinafter New England’s Wholesale Elec-
tricity Markets], available at http://www.iso-ne.com/pubs/spcl_rpts/2012/markets_ 
overview_final_051512.pdf and http://perma.cc/0UeVe85t1Kz; Company Profile, ISO New 
England, http://www.iso-ne.com/aboutiso/co_profile/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 
2013), available at http://perma.cc/0zmbSkmqxmA. ISO-NE’s stated goal is to “ensure a 
reliable and economic supply of electricity to the high-voltage power grid.” New Eng-
land’s Wholesale Electricity Markets, supra at 2. The ISO-NE control area comprises 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id. at 3. 
67 K.S. Cory & B.G. Swezey, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Renewable Portfolio 
Standards in the States: Balancing Goals and Implementation Strategies 8 (2007). 
68 Id. 
69 225 Mass. Code Regs. 14.05(4)(a). 
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ties (DPU) to require that each retail supplier of electricity procure a 
certain percentage of its sales from specific technologies or fuels.70 The 
DPU has discretion over what specific types of renewable technologies 
satisfy the RPS requirements as well as the amount of renewable elec-
tricity to be procured.71 The Massachusetts DPU created a “Solar Carve-
Out” that requires a specified percentage of electricity each year to 
come from in-state solar facilities.72 
2. Arizona: Location-Based REC Multipliers and Preferences for In-
State Component Parts 
 Arizona’s RPS incentivizes the construction of in-state renewable 
generation facilities through the use of extra credit multipliers.73 The 
Arizona Administrative Code defines extra credit multipliers as “a way 
to increase the Renewable Energy Credits attributable to specific Eligi-
ble Renewable Energy Resources in order to encourage specific renewable 
applications.”74 One of the available multipliers is neutral regarding the 
origin of the electricity and simply provides a multiplier ranging from 
10% to 30% for the “early installation” of renewable energy capacity.75 
Arizona also offers multipliers that favor in-state renewable generation, 
including a 50% multiplier for in-state solar generation and a 50% mul-
tiplier for various types of in-state renewable energy generation that 
also use component parts manufactured in Arizona.76 
3. Ohio: Explicit Preference for In-State Renewable Energy 
 The statute and regulations that implement Ohio’s RPS also con-
tain provisions that incentivize in-state renewable energy generation.77 
Rather than providing incentives by offering an REC multiplier, Ohio 
                                                                                                                      
70 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 25A, § 11F(e) (West 2010). Massachusetts’s electric in-
dustry is heavily reliant on natural gas as a fuel source. See Press Release, ISO New Eng-
land, New England Winter Grid Outlook: ISO-NE Forecasts Sufficient Capacity to Meet 
Demand (Dec. 3, 2012). As a result of natural gas prices falling in recent years, approxi-
mately 45% of New England’s generating capacity depends on natural gas and more than 
50% of the region’s electricity is produced using natural gas. Id. 
71 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 25A, § 11F(e). 
72 225 Mass. Code Regs. 14.05(4)(a), 14.07(2). 
73 Ariz. Admin. Code § R14–2–1806. 
74 Id. § R14–2–1801(I) (emphasis added). 
75 Id. § R14–2–1806(C). To be eligible for this credit multiplier, the qualifying facility 
had to be installed and placed into service between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 
2003. Id. 
76 Ariz. Admin. Code § R14–2–1806(D)–(E). 
77 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4928.64(B)(3) (West 2010). 
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imposes an affirmative duty on retail sellers of electricity to meet half of 
the RPS requirements through generation facilities located in-state.78 
Moreover, Ohio recently enacted legislation that expands RPS eligibility 
to include “[a]ny new, retrofitted, refueled, or repowered generating 
facility located in Ohio, including a . . . natural gas generating facility or 
a generating facility that uses biomass, coal, modular nuclear, or any 
other fuel as its input.”79 Therefore, Ohio’s RPS is really not limited to 
renewable energy sources, but includes non-renewable energy as long 
as the generation occurs in-state.80 
4. New Jersey: Defining Eligibility Based on Location 
 New Jersey’s RPS provides that, to be awarded RECs, a renewable 
generation facility must be located within, or deliver electricity to, the 
PJM-ISO region.81 For a generation facility outside the region to create 
RECs under New Jersey’s RPS, the facility’s electricity must be under 
contract for delivery into the PJM region pursuant to the PJM operat-
ing agreement.82 Out-of-region facilities that are eligible for delivery 
into the region are further limited to facilities that commenced con-
struction after January 1, 2003.83 
II. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
A. Dormant Commerce Clause: Background 
 Notwithstanding the purported benefits of state renewable portfo-
lio standard (RPS) initiatives, commentators have speculated that many 
RPSs are likely unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause 
of the Constitution.84 The Constitution’s Commerce Clause grants 
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
                                                                                                                      
78 Id. 
79 2012 Ohio Legis. Serv. Ann. 125 (West). 
80 Id. 
81 N.J. Admin. Code § 14:8–2.7(b) (2013). PJM Interconnection, LLC is a regional 
transmission organization that operates the transmission facilities serving Delaware, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Moeller, supra note 
28, at 81. 
82 N.J. Admin. Code § 14:8–2.7(b). 
83 Id. § 14:8–2.7(c). 
84 Stiles, supra note 6, at 64; Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: 
Their Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy 
Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 Harv. J. on Legis. 259, 270 (2008). 
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States . . .”85 The implications of the Commerce Clause are not limited 
to its affirmative grant of power to Congress.86 Rather, the Commerce 
Clause’s affirmative grant of power to Congress impliedly places a limi-
tation on the ability of states and municipalities to enact laws affecting 
interstate commerce.87 This principle is known as the dormant Com-
merce Clause.88 Using the dormant Commerce Clause, a court can in-
validate a state or local law, even in the absence of congressional action 
and Supremacy Clause issues.89 
 If a state law is struck down as unconstitutional under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, Congress can essentially overrule the judiciary by 
passing legislation expressly validating the state law.90 Congress, howev-
er, is limited by the Commerce Clause in its ability to approve state laws 
regulating commerce.91 Moreover, congressional approval of a state law 
does not exempt the law from scrutiny under other provisions of the 
Constitution such as the Equal Protection or Privileges and Immunities 
clauses.92 
B. Dormant Commerce Clause: Jurisprudence 
 At the outset, a dormant Commerce Clause analysis of a state law 
affecting commerce is bifurcated.93 Two predominant categories of 
state laws subject to judicial scrutiny under the dormant Commerce 
Clause exist.94 The first category includes laws affecting commerce that 
operate to discriminate against out-of-state economic interests through 
“differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests 
that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”95 Discriminatory laws 
can be either facially discriminatory or discriminatory in practical ef-
                                                                                                                      
85 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
86 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (“The cen-
tral rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws 
whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and 
retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent.”). 
87 See id. 
88 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 401(2d ed. 2002). 
89 Id. 
90 W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652–53 (1981) (“If 
Congress ordains that the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce, any 
action taken by a State within the scope of the congressional authorization is rendered 
invulnerable to Commerce Clause challenge.”). 
91 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
92 Chemerinsky, supra note 88, at 429. 
93 See Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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fect.96 When challenged, these state laws are subjected to “strict scruti-
ny,” and are virtually per se unconstitutional unless the state defending 
the law can demonstrate both a legitimate local purpose and that the 
same purpose could not be served through less discriminatory means.97 
State laws subjected to the Court’s strict scrutiny test rarely pass consti-
tutional muster.98 
 Alternatively, some state laws affecting commerce are non-
discriminatory and have only an incidental effect on interstate com-
merce.99 These laws will be subjected to a less rigorous balancing test.100 
For a non-discriminatory state law affecting commerce to be upheld as 
constitutional, a state must only demonstrate that the putative local 
benefits of the law outweigh the costs of the law’s burden on interstate 
commerce.101 The difference in the Court’s treatment of discriminato-
ry and non-discriminatory laws makes the distinction critical.102 
1. Analysis of Discriminatory Laws 
 Assuming a state law is at issue, and that law affects commerce in 
some manner, the first critical inquiry is determining whether the state 
law is a discriminatory or protectionist measure.103 If the state law is 
essentially a discriminatory and protectionist measure, the court will 
apply the strict scrutiny test.104 Under this test, a state law will be held 
unconstitutional unless the state can demonstrate “that it advances a 
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasona-
ble nondiscriminatory alternatives.”105 The burden of proof under 
strict scrutiny lies with the state or municipality defending the law in 
question.106 The burden on the state seeking to defend its law is heavy, 
and the Supreme Court has commented “facial discrimination by itself 
                                                                                                                      
96 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 456 (1992) (finding that an Oklahoma statute 
discriminated on its face and in practical effect); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 
U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (“[T]his regulation . . . in practical effect excludes from distribution in 
Madison wholesome milk produced and pasteurized in Illinois.”) (emphasis added). 
97 Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 100–01; New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 
278 (1988). 
98 See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194, 199 (1994); Wyoming, 502 
U.S. at 456; City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628–29 (1978). 
99 Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99. 
100 See id.; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
101 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
102 See infra notes 99–125 and accompanying text. 
103 Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99. 
104 Id. at 101. 
105 New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278. 
106 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977). 
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may be a fatal defect.”107 Indeed, the Court refers to laws enacted for 
economic protectionism as virtually per se invalid.108 
  In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, a New Jersey law facially prohib-
ited the importation of waste originating from outside the state.109 The 
Supreme Court in 1978 determined that the state law isolated New Jer-
sey from the problem of waste accommodation by erecting barriers to 
trade.110 The law placed a burden on out-of-state interests by explicitly 
disallowing the importation of waste from beyond state borders.111 The 
Court, in striking down the law, found that the contested law fell 
“squarely within the area that the Commerce Clause puts off limits to 
state regulation.”112 
 In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, the Court in 1951 held that a 
local regulation on the sale of milk violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause.113 In contrast to City of Philadelphia, the local regulation in this 
case did not facially discriminate against out-of-state interests, but ra-
ther discriminated in practical effect.114 The challenged ordinance 
prohibited the sale of milk that had not been processed and bottled at 
an approved plant within a five-mile radius of the city’s center.115 Not-
withstanding the local government’s prerogative to provide for the 
health and safety of its citizens, the Court reasoned that because rea-
sonable and adequate alternatives were available, the ordinance violat-
ed the dormant Commerce Clause.116 
 In West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, the Supreme Court in 1994 struck 
down a Massachusetts pricing order that imposed a tax on all milk sold 
                                                                                                                      
107 Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 101. 
108 City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 624. 
109 Id. at 628. 
110 Id. (“What is crucial is the attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem 
common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade.”). 
111 See id. at 618. 
112 Id. at 628. 
113 340 U.S. at 354. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 350–51. 
116 Id. at 354 (“In thus erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local industry 
. . . , Madison plainly discriminates against interstate commerce. This it cannot do, even in 
the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people, if rea-
sonable nondiscriminatory alternatives . . . are available.”) (emphasis added). Scholars 
have interpreted Dean Milk to mean that when a state or local government regulates for 
the welfare and health of its people, the government “only has to use the means with the 
least burden on commerce if the party challenging the state or local law can demonstrate 
that the state or local government could achieve exactly equal benefits through a law that 
would not place a great burden on commerce.” John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, 
Constitutional Law 370 (8th ed. 2010) (emphasis added). 
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by dealers to Massachusetts retailers.117 In conjunction with the pricing 
order, Massachusetts distributed all proceeds of the assessment to in-
state dairy farmers.118 The Supreme Court analogized the combination 
of taxation and subsidies to an impermissible protective tariff or cus-
toms duty.119 Eschewing formalism in favor of case-by-case analysis, the 
Court invoked language from a 1940 opinion stating, “[t]he commerce 
clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious. In each 
case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under attack . . . will 
in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate com-
merce.”120 
2. Analysis of Non-Discriminatory Laws 
 Where a state law is not patently discriminatory with regard to in-
terstate trade, the law is subject to less rigorous judicial scrutiny.121 A 
state law that regulates even-handedly and imposes only incidental bur-
dens on interstate commerce will generally be upheld unless the bur-
den is clearly excessive in relation to local benefits.122 Where a law does 
in fact produce bona fide local benefits, the court weighs the benefits 
against the law’s corresponding burdens on commerce.123 Moreover, a 
court will be more inclined to uphold a law as constitutional if the ben-
efits of the law could not be brought about through less restrictive 
means.124 This analytical approach, outlined by the Court in Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc., is known as the Pike balancing test.125 
 Importantly, where a state law regulates even-handedly rather than 
in a discriminatory manner, the government defending its law will have 
                                                                                                                      
117 512 U.S. at 188. Out-of-state dairy farmers sold approximately two-thirds of the milk 
subject to the assessment. Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 193–94. The Court stated that a tariff or customs duty is the “paradigmatic ex-
ample” of a law discriminating against interstate commerce. Id. at 193. According to the 
Court, tariffs and customs duties violate the principle of a unitary national market by neu-
tralizing the competitive advantage of out-of-state competitors and artificially encouraging 
in-state production. See id. 
120 Id. at 201(quoting Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455–56 (1940)). 
121 Compare Pike, 437 U.S. at 142 (outlining the Court’s balancing test), with Dean Milk, 
340 U.S. at 354 (outlining the requirements of the Court’s strict scrutiny test). 
122 Pike, 437 U.S. at 142. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Daniel M. Forman, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Massachusetts Landfill Mora-
torium: Are National Market Principles Adequately Served?, 24 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 425, 431 
(1997). 
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two distinct advantages.126 First, the burden of proof will be on those 
challenging the law as unconstitutional.127 Second, there is a presump-
tion of validity in that a state law will be upheld absent a showing that 
the law places a clearly excessive burden on interstate commerce rela-
tive to the local benefits.128 A state will not be required to use the least 
restrictive means available to further its goal unless those challenging 
the law can demonstrate that less discriminatory measures can achieve 
the goal with equal efficacy.129 
3. The Dormant Commerce Clause in the Energy and Environmental 
Context 
 In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court in 1992 struck down 
an Oklahoma statute requiring in-state, coal-fired generation plants to 
use at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined coal.130 Applying strict scruti-
ny, the Court held that Oklahoma failed to demonstrate that the statute 
furthered a legitimate local interest that could not be adequately served 
by non-discriminatory alternatives.131 Reasoning that prior Court deci-
sions foreclosed a justification based on protecting local industry 
against interstate competition, the Court found that the statute violated 
the dormant Commerce Clause.132 
                                                                                                                      
126 Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 116, at 341. 
127 Id. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. 
130 502 U.S. at 444, 458–59. Prior to enacting the legislation at issue in Wyoming v. Ok-
lahoma, the Oklahoma legislature adopted a concurrent resolution “requesting Oklahoma 
utility companies using coal-fired generating plants to consider plans to blend ten percent 
Oklahoma coal with their present use of Wyoming coal; effecting a result of keeping a 
portion of ratepayer dollars in Oklahoma and promoting economic development.” Id. at 
443. 
131 Id. at 456. 
132 Id. at 456–57. The concurrent resolution adopted by the Oklahoma legislature pri-
or to enacting the law at issue in this case may have imbued the Court with a sense that the 
law was an impermissible attempt to achieve a presumably legitimate goal by “the illegiti-
mate means of isolating the State from the national economy.” See id. (quoting City of Phi-
la., 437 U.S. at 627). Where a state law facially discriminates against interstate commerce, 
the law must be justified by a factor unrelated to economic protectionism. See Wyoming, 502 
U.S. at 454; Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986); Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 116, 
at 338 (“[T]he economic enrichment of the local persons will not constitute a significant 
or important interest. Indeed, enrichment of local persons through the use of a discrimi-
natory trade barrier should not be deemed a legitimate state goal.”); see also New Energy Co., 
486 U.S. at 279–80 (ruling unconstitutional an Ohio statute giving favorable tax treatment 
to ethanol produced in-state or in a state with a reciprocity agreement). 
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 Maine v. Taylor, decided in 1986, is a rare example of the Court 
upholding a state statute notwithstanding the application of strict scru-
tiny.133 The Maine statute at issue in this case prohibited the importa-
tion of all live baitfish.134 Maine defended the statute by asserting that 
the importation ban protected the state’s fisheries from parasites and 
non-native species.135 In finding that no available non-discriminatory 
means existed, the Court stated that “[a] State must make reasonable 
efforts to avoid restraining the free flow of commerce across its borders, 
but it is not required to develop new and unproven means of protec-
tion at an uncertain cost.”136 The Court stated that “abstract possibili-
ties” of alternative, non-discriminatory methods of protecting Maine’s 
fisheries do not constitute available alternatives.137 Responding to the 
argument that fish can swim directly into Maine’s waters, thereby un-
dermining the preservation of Maine’s fisheries, the Court held that 
impediments to complete success are not enough to prevent the state 
from legislating to protect its environment.138 
4. The Market Participant Doctrine 
 The market participant doctrine allows states to discriminate 
against out-of-state interests in the provision of benefits from govern-
ment programs.139 Under the market participant doctrine, a state may 
                                                                                                                      
133 477 U.S. at 148–51; see supra notes 99–116 and accompanying text. 
134 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 132. Conversely, the Supreme Court struck down a New Hamp-
shire statute empowering the public utilities commission to prohibit the exportation of elec-
tricity produced in-state. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 344 
(1982). 
135 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 133. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine found that 
this was a legitimate local purpose, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 
overturning the district court, did not expressly overrule that determination. Id. at 143. 
The First Circuit did note several factors that “cast doubt” on the purported legitimate 
local purpose, including (1) no other state banned the importation of live baitfish, (2) 
Maine allowed the importation of other freshwater fish subject to an inspection, (3) “an 
aura of economic protectionism” in statements made by the Maine Department of Inland 
Fisheries and Wildlife, and (4) doubts concerning the statute’s efficacy. Id. at 143–44 
(quoting United States v. Taylor, 752 F.2d 757, 761–62 (1st Cir. 1985)). The Supreme Court 
noted that “[s]heilding in-state industries from out-of-state competition is almost never a 
legitimate local purpose.” Id. at 148 (emphasis added). As evidenced by the decision to 
uphold Maine’s statute, the Court found that Maine’s proffered justifications were legiti-
mate. See id. at 148. 
136 Id. at 147. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 151. 
139 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976); Chemerinsky, su-
pra note 88, at 432; Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 116, at 347. 
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provide subsidies to businesses and industries domiciled within the 
state without running afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause.140 For 
the doctrine’s exception to be applicable, the state cannot be acting in 
a regulatory role; it must be participating in the market through the 
expenditure of state funds.141 
 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., decided in 1976, is regarded as the 
seminal case in market participant doctrine jurisprudence.142 In 
Hughes, the State of Maryland instituted a bounty system to incentivize 
the collection and disposal of abandoned cars.143 The law establishing 
the bounty system placed an increased burden on out-of-state scrap 
processors in obtaining documentation to demonstrate the property 
rights required to process the automobile.144 The increased burden on 
out-of-state scrap processors operated to channel the benefits of the 
bounty program to in-state processors.145 The Court held the Maryland 
law constitutional because “[n]othing in the purposes animating the 
Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional 
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to fa-
vor its own citizens over others.”146 
III. Contemporary Dormant Commerce Clause Challenges to 
State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
A. Massachusetts Avoids Constitutional Scrutiny Through Settlement 
 Several varieties of geographic preferences in state renewable port-
folio standards (RPS) exist.147 Geographic preferences in state-level 
RPSs exist in the form of mandates for in-state renewable electricity 
generation, in-state sales of renewable electricity, in-state consumption 
of renewable electricity, and mandates for in-state delivery of the bene-
                                                                                                                      
140 Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810; Chemerinsky, supra note 88, at 432; Nowak & Rotunda, 
supra note 116, at 347. 
141 New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 277 (“That doctrine differentiates between a State’s act-
ing in its distinctive governmental capacity, and a State’s acting in the more general capaci-
ty of a market participant; only the former is subject to the limitations of the [dormant] 
Commerce Clause.”); Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 116, at 346. 
142 See generally 426 U.S. 794 (discussing Maryland as a market participant). 
143 Id. at 797. 
144 Id. at 800. 
145 Id. at 794. 
146 Id. at 810. 
147 See supra notes 52–79 and accompanying text. 
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fits associated with renewable energy facilities.148 Notwithstanding the 
various forms of geographic preferences, as of January 2014, no RPS 
has been held unconstitutional under the dormant commerce 
clause.149 
 In April 2010, a Canadian energy company filed a complaint chal-
lenging two provisions of Massachusetts’s RPS.150 TransCanada, owner 
of a commercial wind farm in Maine, filed the complaint in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts.151 The first provision 
that TransCanada challenged required retail sellers of electricity to so-
licit long-term power purchase agreements from renewable generation 
facilities within Massachusetts.152 In June 2010, the Massachusetts De-
partment of Public Utilities (DPU) issued an emergency regulation re-
pealing the in-state component of the challenged provision.153 Subse-
quently, the Massachusetts DPU issued a second emergency order that 
allowed out-of-state renewable energy producers to submit bids for 
long-term purchase agreements.154 TransCanada’s second challenge 
related to the Massachusetts “Solar Carve-Out,” a requirement that a 
certain percentage of retail electricity come from in-state solar 
sources.155 Rather than amending the RPS to cure the alleged defect, 
                                                                                                                      
148 Rader & Hempling, supra note 17, at app. A-1. Arizona serves as an example of a 
state that incentivizes in-state renewable generation but does not impose an in-state mandate. 
See Ariz. Admin. Code § R14–2–1802 to 1806 (2011) (containing facially neutral language 
with respect to the location of eligible facilities and providing REC multipliers for in-state 
generation). 
149 See Maria Gallucci, Renewable Energy Standards Target of Multi-Pronged Attack, InsideCli-
mate News (Mar. 19, 2013), http://insideclimatenews.org/print/24712, available at http:// 
perma.cc/0YbLBue4uNX (discussing a pending dormant Commerce Clause challenge to 
Colorado’s RPS that “is the first that will go directly to the RPS itself . . . .”). In June 2013, the 
Seventh Circuit commented that “Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce clause 
of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy.” Ill. Com-
merce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013). Alt-
hough at least one commentator believes the Seventh Circuit’s decision casts doubt on the 
constitutionality of Michigan’s RPS,  another commentator described the remark as a “throw-
away comment” unrelated to the question before the court. Steven Weissman, Court Doesn’t 
Cast Much Doubt on Constitutionality of Michigan’s Renewable Portfolio Standard, LEGAL PLANET 
( Jun. 13, 2013), http://legal-planet.org/2013/06/13/court-doesnt-cast-much-doubt-on-the-
constitutionality-of-michigans-renewable-portfolio-standard/,  available at 
http://perma.cc/Z2NQ-77DD. 
150 Fershee, supra note 7, at 83. 
151 Stephen C. Braverman, State Renewable Portfolio Standards and the Commerce Clause, 25 
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Massachusetts entered into a settlement agreement with TransCanada, 
which allowed Massachusetts to avoid amending the RPS.156 
B. The California Low Carbon Fuel Standards 
 In October 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
heard an appeal from a district court decision regarding the constitu-
tionality of California’s low carbon fuel standards (LCFS).157 The LCFS 
regulate transportation fuels that are “sold, supplied, or offered for sale 
in California . . . .”158 Each of these fuels has a different a carbon inten-
sity score.159 This score corresponds to the life cycle emissions of the 
fuel, including emissions related to natural resource extraction, the re-
fining process, and the fuel’s transportation to California.160 
 The plaintiffs in the district court advanced three primary Com-
merce Clause arguments.161 First, the plaintiffs claimed that the LCFS 
impermissibly discriminated against out-of-state corn ethanol.162 The 
plaintiffs asserted that the standards were facially discriminatory in that, 
all else being equal, corn ethanol from California will automatically 
have a lower carbon intensity score than corn ethanol from the Mid-
west because of the distance the latter corn ethanol must travel before 
it reaches California.163 Second, the plaintiffs argued that the LCFS im-
permissibly regulated commerce and the channels of interstate com-
merce.164 Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that the standards imposed exces-
sive burdens on interstate commerce without producing local 
benefits.165 
 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California held 
that the standards impermissibly discriminated against out-of-state corn 
ethanol and regulated extraterritorially in violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.166 Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                      
156 See id. 
157 See Karen Gullo, California Asks Court to Reinstate Carbon Fuel Standard, Businessweek 
(Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-16/california-asks- court-to- 
reinstate-carbon-fuel-standard, available at http://perma.cc/0J6ifPmKugU. 
158 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95480.1(a) (2013); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. 
Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1080 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
159 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95481(a)(16). 
160 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. 
161 Id. at 1078. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 1086. 
164 Id. at 1078. 
165 Id. 
166 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. 
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demonstrated both a likelihood of success on the merits for their 
Commerce Clause claim and likelihood of irreparable harm, and there-
fore the court granted a preliminary injunction against the enforce-
ment of the LCFS.167 
 The court, relying in part on a table attached to the LCFS that ex-
plicitly assigned Midwestern corn ethanol higher carbon intensity 
scores based solely on location, found that the law was facially discrimi-
natory.168 Holding production and input emissions equal, Midwestern 
corn ethanol inherently has a higher score due to the distance it must 
travel to California.169 As a result, the court applied the strict scrutiny 
test of virtual per se invalidity.170 Applying the two-part test for discrimi-
natory statutes, the court held that the LCFS violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause.171 Although the court held that the LCFS serve a 
legitimate local purpose in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the Cal-
ifornia Air Resources Board failed to demonstrate that the purpose 
could not be served through less discriminatory alternatives.172 
 In October 2013, the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the 
LCFS did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce.173 The 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that “to the extent location affects the actual 
[greenhouse gas] emissions attributable to a default pathway,” the use 
of location in determining a fuel’s carbon intensity is not discriminato-
ry.174 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that the use of regional cat-
egories, including explicit reference to California’s geopolitical bor-
ders, did not constitute facial discrimination because ethanol from 
every regional category is effectively treated the same under the regula-
tions.175  In holding that the LCFS are not facially discriminatory, the 
Ninth Circuit remanded for a determination of whether the LCFS dis-
criminated in purpose or practical effect.176 The Ninth Circuit instruct-
ed that if the district court were to make such a finding, strict scrutiny 
would once again be the appropriate standard for review, but if the dis-
                                                                                                                      
167 Id. at 1105. 
168 Id. at 1087. 
169 Id. at 1087. 
170 Id. at 1089; see City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
171 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1093–94. 
172 Id. 
173 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1079, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013). 
174 Id. at 1089–90. 
175 Id. at 1090, 1093. 
176 Id. at 1107. 
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trict court did not make such a finding, the balancing test from Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc. would apply.177 
C. Litigation in the Mid-Atlantic 
 In PPL Energyplus v. Nazarian, the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland in 2013 held that a Maryland Public Service Commis-
sion (“PSC”) generation order that required the construction of a new 
natural gas power plant within a specific, local location did not amount 
to discrimination against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests 
under the dormant Commerce Clause.178 The court reasoned that the 
new generation facility still must compete in the wholesale electricity 
market against other facilities, and that “the PSC did not act for the ex-
plicit purpose of protecting some in-state business . . . ”179 
 In January 2011, the New Jersey legislature enacted the New Jersey 
Long-Term Capacity Pilot Project Act (“LCAPP”) to incentivize the lo-
cal construction efficient generation facilities.180 The LCAPP explicitly 
instructed the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities to consider envi-
ronmental, economic, and community benefits in establishing prequal-
ification criteria for eligible generators.181 Although the plaintiffs relied 
on evidence that demonstrated a preference for in-state generators and 
projects with local benefits, the court held they failed to show a viola-
tion of the commerce clause because “it appears reasonable that the 
Board would incentivize construction in areas where reliability con-
cerns are in flux . . . the incentive for community benefits to generators 
in New Jersey appears reasonable.”182 
                                                                                                                      
177 Id. at 1078. 
178 No. MJG-12-1286, 2013 WL 5432346, at *23–24, *51–53 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2013). 
179 Id. at *51–52. 
180 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:3-98.2(d) (2013) (“[T]he construction of new, efficient gener-
ation must be fostered by State policy that ensures sufficient generation is available to the 
region . . . .”); PPL EnergyPlus v. Hanna, No. 11-745, 2013 WL 5603896, at *19–20 (D. N.J. 
Oct. 11, 2013). LCAPP incentivized construction of these generation facilities by requiring 
public utilities in New Jersey to purchase a portion of the electricity produced by “eligible 
generators.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:3-98.3(c)(1). 
181 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:3-98.3(c)(6). 
182 Hanna, 2013 WL 5603896, at *37. The New Jersey legislature intended LCAPP to mit-
igate electric grid reliability concerns that stemmed, in part, from a lack of local generation 
capacity development. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:3-98.2(e). Ostensibly, New Jersey sought to incen-
tivize local generation development because solving the reliability issues through generators 
located outside of New Jersey would require upgrades to the existing transmission system. See 
id. 
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IV. The Ability of Renewable Portfolio Standards to 
Withstand Dormant Commerce Clause Challenges 
A. Speculation Concerning Challenges to State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause and Proposed Solutions 
1. Constitutional and Practical Analysis of Different Geographical 
Preferences 
 The dormant Commerce Clause is a complex area of law that does 
not afford easily applied bright-line rules.183 As one court noted, 
“[h]armonzing the guidance set out in the Supreme Court’s many 
dormant Commerce Clause opinions is not a simple task.”184 Because 
different lines of scrutiny can simultaneously be invoked, analysis of 
renewable energy mandates exacerbates the difficulty of navigating the 
Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.185 With-
out a substantial body of caselaw on the subject, scholars and practi-
tioners are left to speculate as to how a court would treat various re-
newable portfolio standard (RPS) geographic preferences.186 
Furthermore, recent litigation brings into focus the tension between 
states attempting to incentivize local renewable construction and the 
concerns of private power generators over the marketability of their 
output.187 Some have expected additional litigation in this area for 
years.188 
 Although an RPS geographic preference has never been held un-
constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause, commentators 
have argued that certain preferences are likely to violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause.189 For example, many commentators argue that an 
                                                                                                                      
183 See Am. Bus. Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 2 A.3d 203, 213 (D.C. 2010). 
184 Id.; Richard Lehfeldt et al., Commerce Clause Conflict, 148 No. 12 Pub. Util. Fort. 
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185 Lehfeldt et al., supra note 184, at 41. The dormant Commerce Clause is particularly 
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186 See Ferrey, supra note 58, at 99. 
187 Lehfeldt, supra note 184, at 39. 
188 See Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the 
Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 397, 458 
(2008) (“The growing tension between state and federal electricity regulators may mean 
that a Commerce Clause challenge is impending.”). 
189 See Ferrey, supra note 58, at 99; Stiles, supra note 6, at 64–65; Patrick R. Jacobi, Note, 
Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: How States Can Stop Worrying 
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RPS conditioning renewable energy credit (REC) creation on the in-
state generation of electricity would almost certainly run afoul of the 
Commerce Clause.190 Applying the Court’s analysis in City of Philadelph-
ia v. New Jersey, this type of facial discrimination is virtually per se illegal 
because it allows the legislature to usurp the role of the free market in 
directing the flow of interstate commerce.191 For similar reasons, com-
mentators suggest that an RPS conditioning eligibility on the in-region 
generation of electricity would likely be held unconstitutional.192 
 An RPS can also condition eligibility on the in-state consumption 
of electricity generated using renewable resources.193 Such a require-
ment might not be discriminatory to the extent that an in-state con-
sumption requirement serves as a proxy for realized local benefits.194 
That argument assumes, however, that if renewable electricity is con-
sumed in-state, the environmental, fuel diversity, and other benefits are 
also enjoyed locally.195 Realistically, the purported in-state benefits are 
susceptible to diffusing across state borders and being shared through-
out an entire region.196 Where it is difficult to demonstrate that bene-
fits actually accrue in-state, a court might find that an RPS conditioning 
                                                                                                                      
and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 Vt. L. Rev. 1079, 1111 (2006); see also 
Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regula-
tion: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 Ecology L.Q. 243, 272 (1999). 
190 See, e.g., Stiles, supra note 6, at 64; Endrud, supra note 84; Jacobi, supra note 189, at 
1111–12. 
191 See 437 U.S. 617, 624, 628 (1978). A commentator persuasively argues that in-state 
generation requirements fit squarely within the Court’s City of Philadelphia analytical 
framework. Engel, supra note 189, at 273 n.79. First, similar to the ban on importation of 
garbage, in-state generation requirements halt interstate commerce altogether. Id. Second, 
in both instances, the legislature employed facial discrimination based on the origin of 
interstate commerce. Id. 
192 Compare Ferrey, supra note 58, at 85 (noting that a statute discriminating based on 
state boundaries is likely per se illegal), with Robin Kundis Craig, Constitutional Contours for 
the Design and Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 771, 792 (2010) (commenting that multistate agreements that favor participating 
states are vulnerable to Commerce Clause scrutiny), and Jacobi, supra note 189, at 111–15 
(arguing that states must disguise in-region location requirements to avoid dormant 
Commerce Clause scrutiny). In-region location requirements are distinguishable from in-
state location requirements considering that electricity from multiple states can meet RPS 
obligations, but notwithstanding that distinction in-region location requirements facially 
discriminate against all states outside of the region. Endrud, supra note 84, at 271; see Craig, 
supra, at 792. 
193 Rader & Hempling, supra note 17, at app. A-4 to A-6. 
194 Id at app. A-5. In-state consumption requirements may be a proxy for local benefits 
because if a generator can show that electricity is physically being consumed in a state, 
then the state is receiving the benefits of the renewable electricity. Id. at app. A-4. 
195 Id. 
196 See id. 
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eligibility on in-region benefit delivery would be less discriminatory and 
equally efficacious.197 Therefore, if challenged in court, a proposed in-
state consumption requirement might be rejected under the no-less-
discriminatory-means approach from Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison.198 
 There is considerably more optimism about the chances of other, 
less restrictive, RPS geographic preferences surviving constitutional 
scrutiny.199 An RPS that merely required renewable electricity to be sold 
to in-state consumers would be less likely to violate the dormant Com-
merce Clause.200 As there is no facial discrimination in such a require-
ment, the balancing test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. would be applied 
in lieu of strict scrutiny.201 Under the balancing test, the local benefits 
of reduced carbon emissions and diversification of the energy mix 
would be weighed against the incidental burdens on interstate com-
merce.202 
 Although in-state sales requirements may be upheld as constitu-
tional, not all commentators agree that such requirements are the solu-
tion for a state seeking to reap the benefits of its RPS.203 Conceding 
that an in-state sales requirement might not foster renewable construc-
tion within a given state, some argue that such a requirement would at 
least promote renewable growth, and the corresponding economic and 
environmental benefits, within a state’s geographic region.204 The benefits 
of reduced carbon output in a neighboring state will not be contained 
within the geopolitical state borders, but rather will spill over through-
                                                                                                                      
197 See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); Rader & 
Hempling, supra note 17. If a court found that an RPS requiring benefit delivery offered 
the same benefit as an in-state consumption requirement, but in a less discriminatory 
manner, the in-state consumption requirement could not pass constitutional muster. See 
Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 354. 
198 340 U.S. at 354. In discussing the viability of an in-state consumption requirement, 
commentators note that the administration of such a requirement would be highly com-
plex because of the difficulty in tracking the movement of electrons. Rader & Hempling, 
supra note 17, at app. A-5. 
199 See Engel, supra note 189, at 275–77; Endrud, supra note 84, at 271; Jacobi, supra 
note 189, at 1114. 
200 See Engel, supra note 189, at 275–77; Endrud, supra note 84, at 271; Jacobi, supra 
note 189, at 1114. 
201 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Endrud, supra note 84, at 271. 
202 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. An in-state sales requirement may burden out-of-state con-
sumers in the form of higher prices. See Engel, supra note 189, at 277. Nonetheless, one 
commentator argues that the burden is likely not excessive in relation to the benefits. See 
id. Moreover, she argues that the current Supreme Court jurisprudence does not protect 
out-of-state consumers from price consequences that result from private parties availing 
themselves of legitimate business opportunities. Id. at 278. 
203 See Jacobi, supra note 189, at 1114. 
204 Engel, supra note 189, at 276–77. 
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out the entire region.205 Likewise, the benefits of increased fuel diversi-
ty and the corresponding reduction in price volatility will not be con-
tained within political state borders, but shared throughout the appli-
cable power pool.206 Other commentators are less sanguine and argue 
that where any generator able to establish a contract path to the state is 
eligible to participate in the RPS program with no locational require-
ment, it would be difficult to ensure that the benefits of reduction in 
carbon emissions are actually enjoyed by the enacting state.207 
 Finally, an RPS can condition eligibility for participation on the 
delivery of benefits.208 This approach is less constitutionally vulnerable 
than an explicit locational requirement because it can be employed 
without any facial discrimination.209 Commentators reason that 
“[a]lthough such a policy clearly will exclude distant generators, the 
exclusion will occur not because those generators are located in anoth-
er state, but because their physical circumstances preclude benefits to 
the state.”210 Therefore, because of the physical constraints of the exist-
ing electrical infrastructure, an in-state benefit delivery requirement 
operates as a quasi in-region location requirement.211 
2. How Existing RPSs Can Remain in Effect 
 Although there appears to be concern among commentators that 
in-state and in-region renewable generation requirements may run 
afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause, there are several ways RPSs 
that contain these requirements can remain in effect.212 One possibility 
is lack of dormant Commerce Clause enforcement.213 Alternatively, 
                                                                                                                      
205 Id. 
206 See id. 
207 Jacobi, supra note 189, at 1114 (“[A] contract path does not always reflect the path 
of electricity. In most cases, an extremely distant renewable generator cannot offer many 
environmental benefits to a state without delivering electricity to the state and replacing 
some of the nonrenewable flow.”). 
208 Rader & Hempling, supra note 17, at app. A-3. 
209 See id. 
210 Id. 
211 See id. at app. A-3 to A-4. Commentators demonstrate this point by analyzing 
Maine’s RPS. Id. They note that Maine’s RPS restricts RPS eligibility to generators that can 
deliver renewable electricity into the New England Power Pool. Id. The logic behind 
Maine’s requirement that electricity be deliverable into the New England Power Pool is 
that if a generator is in close enough proximity to deliver into the Power Pool, Maine is 
likely to enjoy the myriad benefits associated with the availability of renewable energy ca-
pacity. Id. 
212 Endrud, supra note 84, at 270. 
213 Id. 
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Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to expressly 
allow state regulation that burdens interstate commerce.214 At present, 
geographic mandates in RPSs have not been subjected to federal en-
forcement claims.215 There simply has not been a successful challenge 
brought against an in-state or in-region generation requirement, but 
potential litigants may pursue the issue in the future.216 
 A more permanent, albeit more difficult, method of preserving 
protectionist measures in state RPSs would be explicit authorization by 
Congress.217 At least one commentator has suggested that Congress 
should consider using its Commerce Clause powers to authorize legally 
vulnerable RPS programs because the societal benefits of increased re-
newable capacity outweigh the burdens some RPSs place on interstate 
commerce.218 
 Lack of enforcement and congressional approval are means of es-
caping scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause.219 When a fed-
eral court first reviews an RPS’s constitutionality under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, as contemporary litigation suggests is imminent, 
RPSs will have to survive constitutional scrutiny.220 
 The market participant doctrine is a potential defense for geo-
graphic preferences embedded in state RPSs.221 As long as the state is 
not acting in a regulatory role, the doctrine allows a state to use its 
“power of the purse” and discriminate against out-of-state interests 
while favoring and directing money towards in-state businesses and in-
dividuals.222 In the context of RPSs, however, one commentator has 
stated that “[t]he state is not expending state funds, except for adminis-
trative costs. It is not really putting state money into interstate com-
merce, as the state did in the Hughes case . . . it is branding and creating 
a new state-created product, and regulating utilities with requirements 
to purchase these products.”223 Other commentators also doubt the 
                                                                                                                      
214 W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652–53 (1981). 
215 Endrud, supra note 84, at 270. 
216 See Sovacool, supra note 188. 
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218 Endrud, supra note 84, at 285. 
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220 Ferrey, supra note 58, at 85; Sovacool, supra note 188. 
221 See Or. Waste Sys. V. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 114 (1994); S. Cent. Tim-
ber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984) (“[I]f a State is acting as a market partic-
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222 Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 116, at 333–34. 
223 Ferrey, supra note 58, at 104. 
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market participant doctrine’s applicability to RPSs.224 Some question 
whether states can create multistate entities that enjoy the same protec-
tions as states themselves enjoy under the doctrine.225 
 If a geographic preference in an RPS did not fit into the market 
participant exception, the goal of a state defending the claim would be 
to avoid the application of strict scrutiny.226 Failure to avoid strict scru-
tiny might virtually ensure that the RPS would be struck down as un-
constitutional.227 
B. An In-Region Location Requirement Conditioning Outside Participation on 
Delivery into the Control Area Survives Strict Scrutiny 
 Assuming the market participant doctrine is inapplicable, the 
treatment of California’s low carbon fuel standards (LCFS) in Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene may lend credence to speculation 
that an RPS in-region location requirement violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause, depending on the district court’s findings on re-
mand.228 With the exception of generators in adjacent control areas 
that deliver electricity into the ISO-New England (ISO-NE) control ar-
ea, Massachusetts’s RPS contains such a requirement.229 Notwithstand-
ing the probability that a reviewing court would apply strict scrutiny to 
Massachusetts’s RPS based on the explicit reference to location, the 
state can argue that the RPS falls into the narrow category of facially 
discriminatory yet constitutional state laws.230 
 Massachusetts’s in-region location requirement serves legitimate 
local purposes, and those purposes could not be adequately served by 
reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives.231 There are functional dif-
ferences between renewable fuels and fossil fuels that render non-
discriminatory alternatives inadequate to serve Massachusetts’s legiti-
                                                                                                                      
224 Craig, supra note 192, at 795–96. 
225 Id. at 795. 
226 Ferrey, supra note 58, at 106. 
227 Or. Waste Sys. 511 U.S. at 101. 
228 See 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (applying strict scrutiny to Califor-
nia’s low carbon fuel standards). 
229 See 225 Mass. Code Regs. 14.05(5) (2013) (describing conditions for RECs pro-
duced outside of ISO-NE to be eligible under Massachusetts’s RPS). 
230 See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (“Our cases leave 
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231 See 225 Mass. Code Regs. 14.05(5); Rader & Hempling, supra note 17, at 34. 
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mate local purposes.232 In addition to the functional difference be-
tween renewable fuels and fossil fuels, the physics of the interstate 
transmission grid render distant generation facilities inadequate substi-
tutes for local generation facilities.233 
1. Massachusetts’s In-Region Requirement Serves Multiple Local 
Purposes 
 Electricity generation accounts for approximately seventy percent 
of the United States’s aggregate greenhouse gas emissions and also 
produces other air pollutants that adversely affect human health.234 To 
the extent that Massachusetts’s RPS promotes the construction of re-
newable generation capacity in New England and the renewable gener-
ation displaces fossil fuel based generation, environmental benefits will 
accrue to the state.235 Even if fossil fuel generation is displaced in a 
neighboring state rather than inside of Massachusetts, the environmen-
tal benefits will be enjoyed throughout the region and not confined 
within geopolitical state borders.236 Where a state has the unquestioned 
authority to provide for the health and safety of its citizenry, Massachu-
setts’s efforts to promote investment in local renewable energy serve a 
legitimate local purpose.237 
 Massachusetts’s RPS also serves the legitimate local purpose of di-
versifying the fuels comprising New England’s wholesale electricity 
mix.238 Nearly fifty percent of ISO-NE’s available generation capacity 
depends on natural gas as a fuel source.239 This dependence on a single 
fuel source leaves ratepayers in Massachusetts vulnerable to fluctuations 
in the price of natural gas.240 Adding renewable energy sources to New 
England’s wholesale electricity portfolio will help insulate Massachu-
setts ratepayers from volatility in the natural gas markets by reducing 
the region’s dependence on natural gas.241 
 Although Massachusetts’s RPS might seem analogous to the statute 
struck down in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the environmental and fuel diver-
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sity benefits make Massachusetts’s RPS distinguishable.242 In invalidat-
ing Oklahoma’s ten percent domestic coal requirement, the Supreme 
Court held that state statutes discriminating against interstate com-
merce are invalid “unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by 
a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.”243 The Court pro-
ceeded to invalidate Oklahoma’s requirement because the state’s cen-
tral justification involved the preservation of local industry.244 The en-
richment of local interests, however, is “almost never a legitimate local 
purpose.”245 Conversely, Massachusetts’s in-region location requirement 
serves two goals that are entirely unrelated to economic protection-
ism.246 
2. Non-Discriminatory Alternatives Do Not Adequately Serve 
Massachusetts’s Local Interests 
 Commentators have suggested that RPSs conditioning eligibility 
on local benefit delivery, such as Maine’s, are constitutional.247 Previous 
scholarship correctly points out that these RPSs avoid facially discrimi-
natory language, and therefore are likely to avoid strict scrutiny under 
the dormant Commerce Clause.248 RPS statutes like Maine’s are un-
doubtedly more likely to be upheld as constitutional because they avoid 
explicit locational requirements, but Massachusetts still can argue that 
such RPSs are not adequate alternatives for its qualified in-region loca-
tion requirement.249 
 Maine’s RPS considers a renewable generation resource eligible if 
its power can physically be delivered into the ISO-NE control area.250 
This is considered a proxy for the ability to deliver benefits.251 In con-
trast, Massachusetts considers a generation facility eligible if it is located 
within ISO-NE or if it is in a control area adjacent to ISO-NE and deliv-
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ers electricity into ISO-NE.252 The phraseology of Maine’s RPS is plainly 
less discriminatory than Massachusetts’s.253 Massachusetts imposes ad-
ditional burdens on out-of-region generators and categorically excludes 
imports from control areas that are not adjacent to ISO-NE.254 Notwith-
standing the appearance that Maine’s RPS is a less discriminatory sub-
stitute for Massachusetts’s RPS, Massachusetts can argue that Maine’s 
RPS does not produce precisely the same benefits in regulating to pro-
tect health and safety.255 
 The electricity of out-of-region generators that can be delivered 
into ISO-NE will not necessarily be delivered into the region. Insofar as 
Maine’s RPS treats deliverability as a proxy for local benefits, Massachu-
setts’s RPS takes a more exacting approach in determining what gener-
ators do and do not produce local benefits.256 Under Maine’s RPS, re-
newable generation output that does not settle in ISO-NE can count 
towards a retail seller’s RPS requirements.257 The delivery requirement 
in Massachusetts’s RPS simply ensures that the output used to satisfy a 
retail seller’s RPS obligations actually produces the benefit of fuel diver-
sity in ISO-NE during the hour the REC was created.258 
 Even in arguing that benefit delivery requirements are facially 
neutral, commentators recognize that such requirements “clearly will 
exclude distant generators” because they cannot produce benefits for 
the state.259 A fact-based benefit delivery test can therefore have the 
same practical effect as Massachusetts’s RPS in that both exclude distant 
generators.260 Indeed, depending on the facts considered and the test’s 
objective criteria, if Massachusetts were to adopt a case-by-case ap-
proach, it is possible that some generators in the PJM region may not 
meet the benefit delivery criteria.261 In that case, Massachusetts’s inclu-
sion of all generators in adjacent control areas may be less burdensome 
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and restrictive than a fact-based benefits delivery test.262 Ultimately, 
both approaches have the practical effect of treating distant generators 
differently from local generators.263 
3. Practical Considerations Justify Massachusetts’s Exclusion of 
Generators Located Beyond Adjacent Control Areas 
 Renewable fuel sources are typically not located in close proximity 
to areas with a significant demand for electricity.264 Unlike the fossil 
fuels conventionally used for electricity generation, renewable fuel 
sources are relatively difficult, if not impossible, to effectively 
transport.265 Fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas can be extracted in 
remote locations, stored, and then efficiently transported to generation 
facilities in compact channels such as railcars or pipelines.266 Essential-
ly, there is an important functional difference between renewable elec-
tricity and fungible fossil fuels.267 
 Because renewable fuel sources are not readily transportable like 
fossil fuels, the most efficient means of producing renewable electricity 
is to convert the fuel (wind, solar, hydro) to electricity at the source.268 
The electricity then must immediately be sent to demand centers 
through transmission lines because unlike fossil fuels, which maintain 
their potential energy, electricity is not a form of energy that can be 
stored on a large scale.269 
 When renewable fuels are converted to electricity at the source, 
and then delivered to markets using transmission lines, electricity is lost 
along the way.270 Electricity traveling through transmission lines faces 
resistance that represents friction, and the resistance causes energy to 
be lost in transmission.271 Resistance and transmission losses are posi-
tively correlated with the length of transmission lines.272 Therefore, 
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holding all else equal, a distant renewable facility cannot displace as 
much fossil fuel based generation as a local renewable facility.273 Massa-
chusetts’s RPS acknowledges and attempts to avoid this problem.274 
Conclusion 
 State and local statutes that facially discriminate against interstate 
commerce are virtually per se unconstitutional, but Maine v. Taylor leaves 
open narrow exceptions to this rule. An RPS’s in-region location re-
quirement can survive strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce 
Clause. First, this requirement will provide the enacting state benefits in 
the form of reduced air pollutant emissions, diversity in the wholesale 
electricity mix, and a degree of price stability. Second, these goals will 
most likely not be achieved with equal efficacy by available, non-
discriminatory alternatives. In addition, fossil fuels can be stored for 
later consumption, and are therefore distinguishable from the transient 
energy provided by renewable sources. Furthermore, electricity losses 
in transmission diminish the utility of distant generation facilities rela-
tive to local generation facilities. RPS provisions conditioning eligibility 
on the delivery of local benefits do not provide the same assurance of 
benefit delivery as an in-region location requirement, and moreover, 
most likely are not an available alternative in practice. Although it may 
be difficult for states to prove the constitutionality of an in-region loca-
tion requirement, it is not impossible. 
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